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More Than Meets The Eye: Design in Disguise 
There is a simple observation that any person can make that carries with it great 
philosophical weight. The observation is apparent to anyone capable of making and it is 
simply that intelligent life exists. This statement is so powerful, that saying otherwise 
only serves as a self-refutation of the statement, since intelligent life is required to posit 
any kind of counter-statement in the first place. From this simple observation, stems the 
Anthropic Principle. The Anthropic Principle, which posits that a unique ability of 
humans to self-report on our observations of the world around us reflects the true nature 
of the universe, is a claim that rests primarily on the assumption that this ability is 
infallible. A secondary consequence of the Anthropic Principle is the implication that this 
infallible ability could not have arisen randomly and thus is an indicator of an intelligent 
designer. However, as observation selection biases will show, our self-reports are not 
always true and therefore the entire assumption that the Anthropic Principle hinges on is 
false, thus rendering it unusable in support of an intelligent design. 
The Anthropic Principle (AP) was only recently developed in terms of its 
formalized definition, in addition to with its implications and adoption within the scientific 
community. To be clear, the statement that intelligent life exists is not the equivalency of 
the AP. In fact before we can even begin to examine the hidden design argument within 
the AP, we must first shift through a number of ambiguous definitions of the AP and 
settle on the definition that is most pertinent to our argument. As of this writing, there 
are four main variations of the AP. They are the Weak, Participatory, Strong, and Final. 
We will begin the selection process with the Weak Anthropic Principle (WAP). The WAP 
essentially states that any physical or cosmological constants that humanity has 
observed up to this point in time, is a reflection of the fact that the universe is old 
enough for sites to exist that have evolved intelligent carbon-based life. This is not a 
very exciting or implicative statement and reveals why the WAP is appropriately called 
weak. The fact that humanity is able to posit such a statement, or really any statement 
for that matter regardless if it is deemed intelligible by logical standards, already shows 
that intelligent life has arisen.  The WAP finds it justification in simply being able to be 
posited. Since it requires no validation outside of itself, it is simply a truism and since 
truisms are not arguments, the WAP cannot be countered and cannot be considered 
philosophically.  
The Strong Anthropic Principle (SAP) is the next variation of the AP to be 
examined. It states that the universe must have particular properties that allow for life to 
develop within it at some point in its history. Unlike the former principle, the SAP does 
have some philosophical implications, as there is a key word in its articulation. The key 
word is must, because it forces us to ask the question, why must the universe have the 
properties that are now observable and reportable to us? Could the universe not have 
just as easily existed without life? A typical answer would be to say no, because 
humanity is already in existence and therefore evidence of it having to come to be this 
way is begging the question. But the SAP is not of great concern to us due to the fact 
that only life, and not intelligent life, is the requirement for it to be satisfied. For example, 
if scientists could construct a self-contained mini-universe, and replicate the conditions 
necessary for the emergence of a single celled organism, or anything else that could 
meet the biological criteria for life, that would be enough to satisfy the SAP and make it 
true. This mini-universe would not have to give rise to intelligent life, only life in its most 
watered down form. The SAP fails to place enough emphasis on the importance 
intelligent life, because the greatest philosophical power, including the hidden design 
within the more general AP, can only be drawn out in a formation of the AP that includes 
intelligent life; therefore it is not worth considering any further.  
The Final Anthropic Principle (FAP) is last variation of the AP that does not prove 
to be useful. It states that once intelligent information processing arises in the universe, 
it will never die out and will continue to remain for the duration of the universe’s 
existence. This statement is also vague enough to have its requirements filled very 
easily. For example, any artifact that denotes some kind of information processing 
ability, most likely in the form of symbol manipulation, would be enough to say that 
intelligent information has not died out. The FAP is also inappropriate for more detailed 
discussion as it is more of a speculative state of the AP and is very optimistic. It rests 
upon the speculation that our human intelligence will somehow be encompassed in a 
way that goes beyond the mortality that is inherent with organic construction, either in 
the form of Artificial Intelligence, or some other kind of computing technology. But 
assuming this kind of technological marvel is even possible, the transference of 
intelligence out of a human body is in no way a full proof step in fulfilling the FAP. If 
humanity is somehow able to preserve its intellectual faculties before our inevitable 
extinction, the preservation of the new intellectual medium is not assured. Imagine 
traveling the stars in robotic bodies only to be confronted with a plethora of new 
problems ranging from meteoroids, radiation, cosmic winds, lack of fuel supplies, etc. 
The critiques could continue for a while, but we will leave the FAP as no more than 
utopian propaganda and move onto the version of the AP that is the most pertinent to 
our argument and the one that contains the hidden design argument, the Participatory 
Anthropic Principle (PAP). 
Easily stated, but highly convoluted, the PAP states “observers are necessary to 
bring the universe into being (Harris, p. 1).” The PAP was influenced greatly by the 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, which was initiated by physicist Niels 
Bohr, a founding father of the scientific field of quantum mechanics. His efforts and 
findings can be summarized in the following passage, “observation and measurement 
thus become prerequisites to the actuality of all determinate properties of quantum 
entities, without which they do not exist in reality but are merely potential” (Harris, pp. 6-
7). In other words, observation is what is necessary to take an event from the realm of 
potential into the physically observable universe. To fully appreciate the viewpoint of 
quantum mechanics, a digression into epistemology and scientific history is required, 
starting with a now outdated view of a mechanistic universe.  
Errol Harris in his book, Cosmos and Anthropos: A Philosophical Interpretation of 
the Anthropic Cosmological Principle, points out that the main assumption of science up 
until the late 20th century was that “observation [is] something that impinges on the 
physical world, as it were, from the outside, without interfering with it; and of the world 
itself a vast automation that runs according to its own intrinsic laws without relation to 
observers” (Harris, p. 2). That is, the universe was something that was believed to run 
by a set of natural laws that functioned in a very mechanistic way, almost like a giant 
intricate and complex machine. This viewpoint of the universe was held throughout 
much of history by great historical figures like Rene Descartes, who gave voice to the 
philosophical problem of the mind body separation, and Sir Isaac Newton, who was able 
to conjure the mathematics necessary to provide some of the scientific backings for the 
mechanistic view of the universe. In fact his contribution was so significant this 
mechanistic viewpoint is often referred to as the Newtonian worldview. A consequence 
of the formalization of the mechanistic worldview via science, was the articulation of 
philosophical arguments that dealt with issues of designs, also known as teleological 
arguments.   
In relation to the overall thesis, it is useful to examine how traditional design 
arguments are constructed and what kind of main arguments they employ in order to 
see why the PAP is actually a design argument in disguise. Clarification must be made 
here since the term design can have multiple meanings and design arguments are thus 
naturally ambiguous and also philosophically tricky. Design on the surface level can be 
defined as the identification of any discernable or recognizable arrangement of parts 
that usually reveals itself in a pattern. For example, we can speak of the design of a 
snowflake, but closer examination will reveal highly structured and patterned shapes 
within the makeup of any particular snowflake. However design in a philosophical sense 
usually references teleological designs, ones that have an end purpose or goal. For 
example, a boat is designed to cross a river or float down stream, much like a watch is 
designed to tell the time. The main point of contention with teleological design 
arguments is that they typically imply a designer, otherwise any design viewed would be 
completely arbitrary, since designed objects have to serve a purpose for those who 
designed them.    
Editor Louis Pojman, in his book, “Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology,” 
includes the most prominent design arguments, including the author of the most 
recognizable argument in favor of intelligent design, William Paley. Paley’s argument is 
an analogy that revolves around a watch and the implication of a watchmaker that it 
brings. In short, a person walking down the beach discovers upon his journey a watch 
lying in the sand. Upon closer examination, this person quickly recognizes a design, as 
evidenced by the interactions of watch’s mechanical parts. Corresponding with seeing a 
watch is the realization that this particular watch could not have simply come to be on its 
own. The design is too complex to have come to be without some kind of intelligent 
designer, in this analogy a watchmaker, inputting his knowledge into the creation 
process.   
To quote Paley directly, “we perceive that its [the watch] several parts are framed 
and put together for a purpose (Pojman, p. 29).” This is the main point of Paley’s 
argument. We can concede that upon examination of the watch, a person will see 
various gears, motors, and springs. However, what is doubtful is to whether or not a 
layperson recognizes the mechanistic process of the watch part itself, at least not in the 
way that a specially trained watch repairperson does. What a person really sees when 
picking up the watch is the teleological end of the watch that of telling time. Figuring out 
that this particular thing on the beach is a watch requires that a person understands the 
purpose first and then the design of a watch. Paley himself subtly illustrates this point 
when he states that “this mechanism being observed (it requires indeed an examination 
of the instrument, and perhaps some previous knowledge of the subject, to perceive is 
and understand it)” (Pojman, p. 30). This summarizes a primary critique about design 
arguments in general; that the recognition of a purpose must come before the 
recognition of a design.  
One question that easily arises from Paley’s analogy is what if the watch that is 
found on the beach is broken and not functioning properly? This is something Paley 
himself addresses with the argument that “it is not necessary that a machine be perfect, 
in order to show with what design it was made; still less necessary, where the only 
question is, whether it were made with any design at all” (Pojman, p.30). What he is 
saying is that if the watch that a person happened to come upon was not actually 
working properly, chances are that this person would still recognize it as a watch, and 
thus still be able to make out the inference of a designer. While it is true that a particular 
machine’s functioning does not affect its design recognition in an observer, it does not 
do anything to subvert the fact that recognition of a purpose needs to come before 
recognition of design. For example, if we happen to come across a vending machine, 
and happen to not receive our desired thirst-quenching beverage, we still recognize that 
it is a vending machine, despite the machine not functioning with it’s intended design to 
fulfill its pre-determined purpose. Whether a designed mechanism works or not has no 
affect on the recognition of a purpose. 
We come to recognize a thing’s purpose, and therefore its design, through 
previous experience with a representation of the purpose that any designed thing tries 
to emulate. Simply put, we can tell that this shiny thing lying in the sand is a watch as 
opposed to a vending machine, because we have experienced it before. The 
recognition of a watch as something designed necessitates that the observer 
understands the concept that is being captured within the design, in this particular case 
time. The watch not only derives its observed recognition as a designed object from the 
physical components that comprise it, but also from the observer’s recognition of the 
object’s emulation of a teleological concept. “He knows enough for his argument: he 
knows the utility of the end: he knows the subserviency and adaptation of the means to 
an end” (Pojman, p. 31). Paley is saying here what has already been said, that the 
recognition of the purpose, or in his words the utility of the end, is necessary to 
recognize design and imply a designer, but here is where the analogy starts to fall apart. 
If the teleological purpose of a thing cannot be recognized, then neither can the 
design, and the weak inference of a designer cannot be made either. Later on in the 
watchmaker analogy when Paley’s line of logic extends from the examination of 
watches implying watchmakers to actual physical humans beings implying god (or more 
generally an intelligent designer), he fails to recognize that the purpose of a human 
being is not clearly defined. The purpose of a watch and the accompanying concept of 
time are agreed upon by the majority of people throughout the world. This is useful to 
our thesis since it shows that people posses the ability to come to a consensus, and 
even more so now that the scientific methodology of knowledge verification has been 
refined, so that a consensus is not solely based on whatever the popular group 
consensus of the time may be. But while the purpose of time can be agreed upon and 
scientifically verified to a degree, the purpose of a human life cannot be. This is 
because the purpose of a human life is self-assigned by a human. The teleological 
purpose of a human does not exist in nature, or in any other realm for that matter, and 
as such the purpose of a human life has always been dynamically shifting throughout 
the course of history and is prone to cultural beliefs and biases. This is important 
because if the purpose of a human being cannot be recognized, then the inference of a 
designer has no solid argumentative ground upon which to stand.  
The watchmaker analogy goes to show that analogies are commonly used in 
design arguments, but as philosopher David Hume address in his “Critique of the 
Design Argument,” analogies are weak if not completely useless tools in support of 
design arguments. This is because analogies are better suited for clarification rather 
than explanation. By definition, an analogy is a similarity between like features of two 
things, on which a comparison may be based. This is how analogies draw their great 
literary strength in forms such as poetry and prose, because one familiar thing may be 
used in conjecture via an analogy to explain another perhaps less familiar thing (it could 
not be completely unfamiliar otherwise the analogy could not proceed). In other words, 
the effectiveness of an analogy is completely based of the degree of similarity between 
two objects. This is where an analogy gets its greatest strength but also its greatest 
weakness which Hume highlights, “whenever you depart, in the least, from the similarity 
of the cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence” (Pojman, p. 32). In other words, 
the more dissimilar two objects are, the less sense it makes for the two of them to be 
used in an analogy for explanatory purposes. 
To elaborate further on the matter, take the concept of blood circulation. It’s fine 
to infer via analogy that the blood flow in a human being named Dave is strikingly 
similar, if not the same, in another human being named Ramona. This is due to the 
degree of the similarity between Dave and Ramona, because they are both humans. If 
we continue to take the analogy’s starting point of Dave’s blood, but instead analogize it 
to the blood flow of a furry feline named Karloff, we already see that the analogy begins 
to lose a bit of its strength. We could still make a weak inference between the blood 
blow of Dave and the blood flow of Karloff, but because Dave is a human being and 
Karloff is a cat, the dissimilarity causes the analogy to degrade, even if only slightly. If 
we were to stretch the analogy further and analogize the blood flow of Dave, to a tree, 
the dissimilarity between the two items of comparison would now be too great to render 
any kind of causal inference via analogy as utterly non-explanatory. What happens is 
just as Hume says, “the dissimilitude is so striking that the utmost you can here pretend 
to is a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause” (Pojman, p. 32). 
A guess or conjecture is certainly not something that can be put towards an argument of 
an intelligent designer.   
In addition to critiquing the functionality of analogies, Hume also explained the a 
posteriori knowledge base, or knowledge that is gained after an experience has taken 
place, “when two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined 
together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one wherever I see the existence of 
the other; and this I call an argument from experience” (Pojman, p. 35). A posteriori 
examples include how we come to know that smoke indicates fire, thunder follows 
lighting, etc. What the watchmaker analogy also does is erroneously take the a 
posteriori formula and says that human intelligence accompanies a designer.   
 Paley’s analogy works fine in implying the presence of a watchmaker with 
watches, not only because it utilizes things with which almost anybody has had 
experience, but because both of those things that are being used occur in almost the 
exact same time and place. The two things here are the watchmaker and the watcher 
and at the very first moment of preliminary creation, the watch and the watchmaker are 
metaphysically inseparable. They are closely tied together in both time and space 
during the designing process and are only separated after the watch is complete. So the 
time that passes in between the completion of a watch and its subsequent discovery by 
a wandering beach traveler does not matter in a possible refutation of the a priori 
knowledge base.  
A posteriori knowledge claims not only rely on two things occurring closely in 
both space and time, but also on the observable nature of the two items being 
conjoined. For example we could physically see the process of a watch being built, but 
this is not a necessary condition because with the use our advanced intelligence, we 
could come to learn of the association of a watchmaker and watch through another 
medium other than sight, like a book, film, or a riveting lecture on the joys of watch 
making. Any of the above examples are simply recordings of a conjoining that still 
retains the possibility of actually occurring. The pertinent point is that for a posteriori 
knowledge claims to work, both things must be observed together and be capable of 
being observed. The problem occurs when the very thing that allows the conjoining to 
occur is the thing that is looking to be conjoined.  
What’s wrong with Paley’s thinking is that intelligence and a designer of said 
intelligence can never be observed as conjoined because the intelligence that is 
supposed to be posited from the watchmaker analogy is an abstract concept, something 
that is incapable of being observed and therefore in capable of being conjoined and 
used in any line of a posteriori reasoning.  
The designer in Paley’s argument is primarily used as a reference to god, but in 
the interest of brevity and to avoid the repercussions from invoking such a term, we will 
restrict the investigation to the broader concept of an intelligent designer in general. 
Since an intelligent designer is an abstract concept, the a posteriori method cannot 
apply to it. If it were able to, the intelligent designer would have to be an observable 
thing, but it is an abstract concept and the essence of an abstract concept is simply that, 
abstractness, not existing in physical reality. This is because abstract concepts originate 
from general human intelligence. Thus what Paley’s analogy is actually doing is 
attempting to conjoin human intelligence with the concept of an intelligent designer, 
which comes from the intelligence in the first place, so he is trying to conjoin human 
intelligence with itself! Certainly one cannot conjoin something with itself and call it 
sound a posteriori reasoning.   
Hume goes on to critique two more portions of the watchmaker argument, that of 
intelligence, and the designer himself. “What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of 
the brain which we call ‘thought,’ that we must thus make it the model of our whole 
universe?” (Pojman, p. 34). Hume is addressing the treatment of the human intelligence 
(which is not only conscious but also self-reflective) as a phenomenon that is so 
extraordinary that it must reveal a key insight about the world in which we find 
ourselves. While it is all too easy to think that our intelligence reveals something about 
the universe, Hume thinks that “thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in 
mean and other animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the 
universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred other which fall 
under daily observation” (Pojman, p. 34). In other words, intelligence should not be 
treated as the framework from which we view all the others elements of the universe 
from deriving, because intelligence itself is contained within the universe as a whole, 
just as arterial circulation, or gravity, or heat, is it is therefore ill-suited to be the basis for 
the foundation of the universe.  
Design arguments often employ the strategy of taking a smaller part of a whole 
(in this case the entirety of physical reality) to be indicative of the whole. To use an 
analogy for clarification purposes, since Hume has already shown us that explanatory 
purposes are ill-conceived, having a blind man try to describe an elephant to a person 
by only holding the trunk would be a rather pointless task and no sane person would 
accept the definition of elephant based upon a description given by a blind man. The 
blind man only has access to one part of the whole, in this case the trunk of the 
elephant. Likewise, intelligence is an aspect of the universe that we as humans have 
access to, granted we do have others like opposable thumbs or immune systems but 
this one seems to grab our attention the most, that we use to explain the necessity of a 
designer for this universe. Intelligence is merely our trunk on the elephant of the 
universe. 
The final pertinent point that Hume makes in his writing that is related to the 
watchmaker analogy’s is his view on aided versus unaided creation. Paley’s analogy 
sublimely posits that past a certain level of complexity, certain things we encounter in 
the world can only have come to be with the aid of an intervening hand. This is known 
as aided creation and can be easily applied to many human creations such as nuclear 
bombs, motorcycles, and movie soundtracks. Things that lie below this level complexity 
are thought of as being able to come into existence without any aid and are by-products 
of random chance. But as Harris points out, “any process that is directed towards a final 
state or condition, such as the ontogenetic development of an embryo or the growth of a 
plant, may be regarded as teleological without presuming any conscious purpose or 
deliberate intent” (Harris, p. 163). In other words, a design need not indicate a designer. 
Hume too realizes this when he states “what surprise must we feel when we find him 
[the ship maker] a stupid mechanic who imitated others, and copied an art which, 
through a long succession of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections, 
deliberations, and controversies had been gradually improving?” (Projam, p. 37). If this 
sounds familiar it is because it is extremely similar to Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection, the nail in the coffin for design arguments. 
Proponents of an intelligent designer often fail to understand that things that may 
seem complex and thus should be indicative of an intelligent designer are improved 
reproductions, rather than complete and total designs. A jumbo jet, watch, or even a 
human eye, is a product of a self-replicating process, although with regards to the jet 
and watch, the reproduction process may seem like aided creation. What happens is 
that each successive generation makes modifications upon the last one, resulting in 
designed that can be taken as having been complexly designed in one-shot. The word 
improvement is purposefully removed here since improvements can imply an ultimate 
end state, otherwise why would there be a need for improvements? Modifications take 
the form of improvements in human creations, we can easily say that in the last 200 
years transcontinental transportation has improved from wooden sailing ships to jumbo 
jets, but improvements are often mistakenly labeled to non-human created phenomena. 
The reason for this is that the process of natural selection unfolds at a pace that is not 
readily noticeable within an individual human’s lifetime, so most people easily forget that 
the complex thing they see before them is the temporary champion of a random trail 
and error process that has decimated so many other variations of a supposedly 
intelligently designed complexity. Unlike humanity, nature does not often have the 
luxury of being able to record its previous achievements and most are hidden far behind 
the veil of history.     
What if this trail and error process that can eventually lead to the facade of 
complex design, is actually itself something that is intelligently designed? This is what 
Richard Swinburne proposes in his work, “The Argument from Design.” If the objection 
to design arguments, that complex things can and do arise from simple things, is itself a 
process that is intelligently designed, then the focus of design arguments could still 
hold. “The laws of nature are such as, under certain circumstances, to give rise to 
striking examples of spatial order similar to the machines which men make. Nature, that 
is, is a machine-making machine. In the 20th century men make not only machines, but 
machine-making machines. They may therefore naturally infer from nature which 
produces animals [and] plants, to a creator of nature similar to men who make machine-
making machines” (Pojman, p. 40). This statement falls victim to the mistake of taking a 
portion as indicative of the whole. The fact that man is a machine-making machine (in 
terms of biological input and output functioning) is the exception rather than the rule. A 
quick cosmological overview of the universe will reveal to us that nature is in no way a 
machine-producing machine. Evidence visible to us in the forms of biological life is 
scarce at best. We are the exception to the Swinburne’s supposed rule of nature. If 
nature really was a machine producing machine, we would see far greater evidence of 
machines within the universe, not just ourselves. 
Swinburne also states that, “the laws of their behavior can be set out by relatively 
simple formulate which men can understand and by means of which they can 
successfully predict the universe” (Pojman, p. 40). What he is referring to here is that 
things that come under our observation, the chemical and physical processes of 
circulation for example, are simple. This statement reeks of ignorance and fails to 
consider the fact that working order of the universe is anything but simple. It may be 
simple in the areas in which we can occupy and observe, but the most far down level of 
our understanding of the universe, quantum physics, says that the universe is 
fundamentally a chaotic place, not subject to predictability. Even things within our realm 
of existence, like the weather, are still fairly unpredictable, and if something is 
unpredictable, according to Swinburne’s logic, it cannot really be reflective of the 
machine-producing machine nature of the universe.   
The same laws that Swinburne is so fond of also reveals that humanity occupies 
an infinitesimal corner of the universe. Plus the laws that posit formulaic knowledge and 
predictability only work with things that can be included to be formulaic and 
predictability. But this works when you consider a reason that Swinburne may posit this 
view in order to support another viewpoint. “If creatures are going consciously to extend 
their control of the world, they will need to know how to do so. There will need to be 
some procedures which they can find out, such that if they follow those procedures, 
certain events will occur. This entails the existence of temporal order. There can only be 
such procedures if the world is orderly, and, I should add, there can only be such 
procedures ascertainable by men if the order of the world is such as to be discernible by 
men” (Projam, p. 45).  
In other words, the world has to be governed by laws of nature that are 
discernable by agents within nature, if agents are consciously to extend their control of 
it. This statement is true and could be used in support for design arguments if it were 
not for the fact the discernibly of the laws of nature are open to interpretation because 
the agents describing them (humans) impose order in an attempt to make sense of the 
chaotic nature of the universe.   
Here a discussion of epistemology, or the study of knowledge, is an essential 
piece to our thesis, both to the formation of the PAP and to critiques of design 
arguments as well. To speak of it without addressing the background content that 
promoted its formation would be to take for granted assumptions that could potentially 
undermine its entire structure. While full of many sub-theories, epistemology can be split 
into two main camps that have two opposing viewpoints. The first holds that the world is 
faithfully represented by our mental representations and ordinary language. The second 
and opposing branch holds that the world is radically different from our perception of it. 
Examining which camp is valid will also reveal the validly of an author’s statement since 
epistemology cannot be completely separated from design arguments and since the 
PAP is an ontological (design) claim, there is a sublime epistemological claim that 
comes along with it.  
In his review of the historical development of epistemology, Roland Omnes notes 
that the epistemology first began within the first branch mentioned above and focused 
heavily on the notion of innateness. A popular viewpoint held by Socrates was the 
notion that the soul was immortal; therefore all knowledge had already been acquired, 
and learning was simply a matter of recollecting knowledge that already lay innate 
within a person. In the Platonic dialogue of Meno, Socrates gets a slave boy to both 
understand and perform complex geometry exercises, without any previous formal 
instruction, thus lending supposed support to the innate view point of knowledge. 
The innateness of knowledge viewpoint was advanced further in the 17th century 
by John Locke with the positing of empiricism. Empiricism holds that, “all ideas come 
either from the five senses or from reflective consciousness. It is the concrete objects 
perceived by our senses that are at the origin of ideas, that is, of the presence, inside 
us, of their faithful image” (Omnes, p. 66). Locke’s viewpoint was also investigated by 
famous child specialist psychologist, Jean Piaget in his discovery of innate ideas within 
children. His findings however emphasize a different kind of knowledge, not semantic or 
fact based knowledge, but more procedural or muscle memory based knowledge. 
Certain reflexes are present in newborns like hand grasping, underwater breath holding, 
crying at the sound of other babies crying, etc. These innate abilities are in all human 
children, regardless of culture or geographic location. But this kind of innateness is not 
the kind that Socrates was addressing. Children do not have immediate access to 
language, and therefore do not have direct access to concept formation and exchange, 
the basis of semantic based knowledge. 
It wasn’t until recent developments in neuroscience, that the first base camp of 
knowledge was really shown to be incorrect. Vision is a process that was assumed to 
relay information directly, almost like a camera, except the eye is the lens, and the mind 
is the film (or to use a more modern analogy relevant to today’s society, the LCD 
screen). Recent findings indicate that vision works more by breaking down the external 
environment and sending different bunches of data to the brain where it can be 
reassembled. This leads into an observation that Omnes himself has made “our mental 
representations, even, if they originate from the world around us, are reconstructions. 
They are far from being simple or obvious. Their validity is most questionable when 
science takes us to unfamiliar surroundings, among electrons or the universe as a 
whole for example” (Omnes, p. 69). Since vision seems to be the support beam of 
mental representations (think about the commonly used term mind’s eye), the 
significance of finding that the physical process is one that breaks down and then 
reconstructs leads us to believe that the same processes holds true for mental 
representations, for if vision is the key to building mental representations, it wouldn’t 
follow that vision is a chunky process, while mental representation is not.   
A final blow to the innate based epistemological viewpoint comes from the realm 
of quantum mechanics. A basic assumption in the field known as Pauli’s principle 
rejects the classical thinking notion that two objects should always be distinguishable by 
some feature. “Two objects (two substances) should always be distinguishable by some 
feature in classical thinking. Quantum physics gave up this notion of inherence also in 
one of its most basic principles (Pauli’s principle)” (Omnes, p. 76). Since various 
repeated experiments have shown this to be the case, the details of which are beyond 
the scope of this argument, this means that the external world and our internal mental 
representations cannot be equivalent. For if our knowledge of the world is to be derived 
from sensory experience, and the world contains instances where sensory experience 
cannot accurately distinguish differences, then what we see is not what we get and 
there must be something more beyond the veil. Thus, the first epistemological viewpoint 
is rendered invalid.  
This is important because the view of a mechanistic universe was also entwined 
with a view of innateness. Most historical design arguments were reflective of the 
assumption of a mechanistic universe, but notions like Darwinian natural selection could 
explain the existence of things that were supposedly were influenced teleologicaly, thus 
removing the designer aspect of arguments. However just because the notion of a 
mechanistic universe is not fully adopted by modern science, does not mean design 
arguments have disappeared entirely. With a new view of the universe comes a 
redefinition of the design argument. 
This redefinition first begins in the realm of sense-data theories. Sense-data 
theories are a general collection of statements within Empiricism that declare all 
knowledge is derived from the senses. In other words, what a person perceives is 
reflective of the external natural world. But problems arise very quickly with the theories, 
a main critique being that  “if it were true it could not be known, and if it is known it 
cannot be true” (Harris, p. 122). Harris is speaking of the philosophic problem on how 
we can report on our perceptions, or how the causal chain of turning physical objects 
into mental representations occurs. A person is not self-aware of how mental processes 
come to be, only that he or she has certain mental representations and that there are 
physical objects in the world that correspond to those representations. There is clearly a 
gap and any self-reporting on the casual chain is bound to be false. 
Another problem that arises with sense-datum theories is a classical critique, but 
one that Harris uses as support for the PAP as design argument. The critique is that of 
false perceptions. It should appear obvious that people can have many false 
perceptions of the world around them, either due to an altered state of consciousness, 
or a misinterpretation of something in the world. A person may think a snake is ready to 
strike, when really it is just a garden hose lying in the corner. Harris acknowledges this 
short-coming of sense-data theories but twists it around by positing that this weakness 
is actually a sign of a greater strength. “In perceiving we become aware of far more than 
we can possibly sense immediately in any single apprehension, and to the equally 
important problem of how what one can directly sense is related to what one thereby 
comes to know in the actual perception” (Harris, p. 124).  
What he is saying in the above passage is that sensing and perceiving are not 
equivalent and if they are not equivalent, then knowledge cannot be directly related to 
sensation. Also we are aware, and therefore experiencing, of only a fraction of the total 
amount data the world can send to us at a single moment. When a person perceives 
something via sensory experience, there is an organizational process going on inside 
the mind. Past experiences combine with mental representations to provide a more 
complete picture of the current situation than. The mind adds something extra to the 
sensory data to make perception possible. “Knowledge is organized experience, and 
that primitive sentience is below the level of organization essential to cognition, without 
which there can be no perception. All perception is knowledge and none is mere 
sensation; it is the awareness that a recognizable object, however simple, is being 
sensed-that some identifiable object is present to the senses” (Harris, p. 127). In 
perceiving the presence of a cat, a person is also aware of that perception. This 
organizational structure that the mind employs in order to fully generate something that 
can be perceived can also be found within the natural structure of the universe and it in 
is the comparison between the organizational principle of mind and universe that the 
hidden design argument reveals itself.  
“The subject is nothing less than the universal principle of wholeness that has 
been immanent throughout the process of nature, and is intrinsic to the organic unity 
now come to consciousness through the sentience of the organism” (Harris, p. 131). 
Harris is saying a lot in the above passage, to begin, the term organic unity is used. 
From a plainly descriptive point, organic unity can simply mean that all living organic 
things are united on some base level, most likely at the chemicals within DNA. A step 
further would be to say that all organic entities are united via a shared elemental 
composition that is found throughout the entire universe. The statement draws this 
conclusion based upon the fact that elements with life can also be found within non-
organic things like stars and planets.  
But as Harris also points out, “no whole can be complete unless brought to 
consciousness, the universal principle of structure comes to self-awareness in the 
consciousness of a cognizant subject, through the natural process that issues in human 
experience of a perceived world” (Harris, p. 132). What he is saying is that the concept 
of organic unity, the basis for the wholeness of the universe, is only possible when there 
is some kind of conscious agent that can perceive this unity. Thus the universe is whole 
only when through its own organizing intrinsic organizing principle has it given rise to a 
being (presumably humans) that can then in turn use the same organizing principle 
endowed by the universe, to organize the organizing principle. 
This statement is precisely a kind of teleological design the Harris attempts to 
refute earlier in his book and it also echoes the PAP. Having the universe organize itself 
via a conscious agent’s perception of this organizing principle, in order to be a whole is 
undeniably a goal oriented process. This kind of design doesn’t require the need for an 
intelligent designer, since the conscious agents are contained within the universe itself. 
We don’t reside outside of the universe and aren’t looking outside in. We are inside 
looking around. As the astronomer Carl Sagan says, “we are a way for the universe to 
experience itself. 
The PAP works by first listing off a multitude of reasons for why the presence of 
life in the universe is a highly improbable occurrence, but obviously it is not 
impossibility, because otherwise nothing could be said about anything, since there 
would be no one around to even be able to begin to formulate such a statement.  
While the universe does seem to display a slight hostility to the presence of life within it, 
that does not mean that the improbable fine-tuned character of the universe should be 
taken as empirical evidence of either a design, purpose, or deliberate intent. It has 
already been shown that designs can be the result of chance and do not have to come 
about only by necessity or with assistance from some other intervening agent.  
A purpose is really a conjecture between two concretely observable events and 
has to have some kind of benefit from its formation. The question could be asked then is 
the emergence of life beneficial in anyway to the universe? The answers to this thought 
experiment cannot begin to be examined until one considers that even by asking it, we 
are implying that the universe has some kind of agency, which touches upon the final 
implication of the fine-tuned character of the universe, deliberate intent.     
Of course deliberate intent is coincident with intelligence and is therefore 
inseparable from it as well but serves to show us how the PAP is a design argument in 
disguise. The PAP implicitly states that improbability of life being present anywhere 
within the universe should indicate that life itself has inherent value. With specific 
regards to what that value is and how we should act in its presence is unknown and 
frankly irrelevant. However a further aspect of the hidden design argument of the PAP is 
revealed when one considers that when anything is deemed valuable, an axiological 
judgment is taking place. Agents that possess the ability to arbitrarily label something as 
valuable can only do this kind of judgment process. In this case that value labeling 
ability is a consequence of the possession of intelligence, but the capacity of 
intelligence itself is not inherently valuable. It is not valuable to be able to say what is 
valuable because what we deem to be valuable does not have any inherent essence 
otherwise it would not need to be labeled as such. The value labeling ability that stems 
from intelligence is better defined as practical in that it serves no other function than to 
identify what is in our best interests and will suit our needs. But because what is in our 
best interests or what will suit or needs will not is not static, there is no inherentness to 
whatever that particular practical need may be at the time. Therefore the claim that life 
is in someway valuable and thereby indicative of an intelligent designer via design, 
purpose, or deliberate intent does not hold philosophical weight. 
While it is true that at this point in time science cannot explain the beginning of 
the universe, for scientific inquiry relies on precedent events to fully explain something, 
it does not make sense to say that if no scientific explanation can provide a causal 
account of the beginning of the universe, then the explanation must be personal in 
nature and framed in terms of the intentional action of a rational, supernatural agent. 
This is because of the notion that if something occurs that is not explained, it is more 
likely that what occurs will be simple rather than complex, does not hold. The reason is 
that when one appeals to an intelligent designer via the PAP, certain expectations about 
the universe follow from that appeal: the universe displays order, is comprehensible, 
and favors the existence of beings that can comprehend it, which is already presumed 
within the PAP itself. The favoring of beings portion is what the various versions of the 
Anthropic Principal is all about and has already been addressed, so the key here really 
lies in the comprehensibility assumption. At our current point we have a fairly detailed 
explanation of the workings of the universe, not complete, but impressive nonetheless. 
So if we can understand and explain the complex, then we should certainly be more 
than capable of comprehending the simple. This defeats the position of design 
supporters who say that the ultra-simplistic nature of an intelligent designer excludes it 
from explanation. It simply does not make sense to say that we cannot explain the 
complex but not the simple, from which the complex is supposed to originate. 
The final point of consideration in rejecting any and all teleological implications 
from the PAP derives from the nature of observation itself. The kind of observation 
essential to both science and philosophy cannot simply be equated with physiological 
vision, despite the fact that vision is the primary means in which observation can take 
place. Although other senses like hearing do contribute to the overall observational 
process, they do so to a lesser degree and aren’t of primary concern. This because 
observation is really a two-part combination of both the physical process of seeing and 
the mental process of interpretation, not simply seeing alone.  It is the ladder part of this 
particular combination that is of greater consequence to our thesis, but it should not be 
addressed without first elaborating further on sight itself. 
Sight itself is actually a narrowly limited physical and involuntary observational 
apparatus. Barring any physical blockage or damage of eyesight, it is safe to say that no 
one can consciously control the photochemical excitation process that occurs with the 
retinas when they are hit by photons bouncing off an object like an x-ray film. So one 
would be correct in saying that when two perfectly normally functioning human beings 
see a cancerous x-ray film via sight, they both are actually seeing the same thing, in the 
sense that the electric signals that are transmitted to each individual’s brains are the 
same. The question now arises as to how either of the two people can tell that the x-ray 
film they are seeing is also indicative of the presence of cancer? Now if we were to 
learn that one of these individual’s were actually a trained radiologist, then it would be 
all too easy to simply reference to his or her training as the reasoning for the ability to 
observe the cancer on the film, but since we have already established that the two 
people are seeing the same thing based strictly off of sensory input, we have to 
conclude that the differences in observation between the two people occurs at another 
level. That is the level of interpretation.  
The other component of observation, interpretation, is more of a mental process 
than a physical one because it invokes mental apparatuses to impose meaning onto the 
physical data that is collected from seeing, mainly concepts and memories of past 
experiences. However it must be acknowledged that these mental apparatuses do 
indeed have a symbiotic relationship with physical inputs. Defined rather simply, a 
concept can be taken to be a symbolic representation that resides within the mental 
realm. If viewed this way it is easy to see how a concept cannot even begin to take on 
symbolic qualities without first having a connection to a physical world in which there 
are things that are capable of being represented. So because the primarily mental 
construct of interpretation is somewhat dependent on physical inputs, it can therefore be 
subjected to fluctuations in physical states.  
For example, if the physical sensory input from sight is alerted before 
interpretation can take place, then the subsequent interpretation is highly subject to 
error. An easy example is the ever dreaded “beer goggle” phenomena present 
throughout the country’s many universities and bars. A simple chemical ingestion of 
alcohol can alter physical sight as to render decisions, which are easily said to be a 
consequence of interpretation, to be of a regrettable nature. What this seemingly trivial 
occurrence goes to show that is that the state of an observer can affect the way in 
which observation takes place. 
The importance of the state an observer is not simply limited to the time in which 
a particular observation is taking place. A single occurrence of observation can have 
long lasting effects and consequences, depending on the intensity of the observers 
state, and subsequently influence further acts of observation. Since the physical state 
an observer is in will lead to concept formation, the basis of which is need for 
interpretation, observation cannot occur in isolation from conceptualization. Experiences 
from physical inputs color our conceptual formation, but in time our concepts turn 
around and color our experiences in such a way that they render the possibility of 
objective observation impossible. This is essentially an alteration of philosopher of 
science Norman Hanson’s theory-ladeness of observation.  
Evidence that observation is theory-laden and influenced by conceptual 
formation comes from research gathered by psychologist’s studies into the phenomena 
known as the confirmation bias. Simply put, this bias is the strong tendency for humans 
to favor information, which confirms beliefs and avoids contradictory evidence and 
opinions. As a result, evidence is gathered from memory selectively and interpreted in a 
biased way. The confirmation bias is more strongly seen in emotionally significant 
issues and for established beliefs. So in science, hypothesizes are generally worked 
towards being true rather than being proven false. 
Since observation involves both physical and mental components, Hanson’s 
implications for the physical part deserve our initial attention, especially since much of 
data used in support of the PAP is not directly observable in our everyday experience. It 
has already been shown that human sight can easily become suspect at a moment’s 
notice and is a limited capacity. Man’s general understanding of this assertion is easily 
seen when the historical unfolding of technological development is taken into 
consideration. Devices like the telescope, microscope, fMRI, etc. have all increased 
man’s observational capacity, but by increasing his ability to physically see, they have 
also increased the need to interpret and thus strengthened the conformational biases. 
These instruments are supposed to have gotten us closer to a more objective reality, 
but really all they have done is increased the amount of data available in need of 
interpretation. While there has been obvious utilitarian benefit to the development of 
these technologies, it has made the process of interpretation longer and more complex, 
but despite these advances there is no guarantee that they come closer to a true 
description of reality.        
The measuring apparatuses run into the same problem that befuddles the direct 
line of sight observation of a human being. Whereas humans typically succumb to 
psychological errors, machines succumb to mechanical errors. A machine can be 
miscalibrated and thus skew the data collection before interpretation even begins. They 
fall victim to “machine beer goggles.” This may seem obvious, but the consequence of 
this supports theory-ladeness in the fact that human observers are the ones who have 
to recalibrate the machines. The process itself presupposes a reference back to a 
concept of how the machine is supposed to work, mainly with regards to its level of 
precision.  
For our purposes this desired level of precision is an extension of the process of 
referring back to a concept that is inherent within any act of observation. For example, a 
scale that is used for personal weight loss is acceptable within that particular sphere of 
operation, but insufficient in capturing the mass of atomic compositions. This level of 
precision is reflected in the determination of “good evidence,” a process which itself is a 
kind of observation, and goes to show that any phenomena could be potentially be used 
as good evidence for any desired hypothesis. In an attempt to restrict anything from 
supporting anything and inflating the confirmation bias to galactic proportions, 
restrictions have to be made on acceptable kinds of evidence, but the nature of these 
restrictions have to be arbitrary, because how can we impose a kind of objective 
measurement on what we would be attempting to show being objective in the first 
place? Even Israel Scheffler, an opponent of theory-ladeness touches upon this, 
“accepting a hypothesis tends to restrict our view to certain of our categories, that is, to 
those which accord with the hypothesis itself” (p. 47, Boersema).  
It must be noted that advocating the theory ladeness of observation is close to 
but not the same thing as advocating the philosophical view of idealism. The more 
important consequence of Hanson’s point is the dismissal of the notion that the universe 
has any kind of knowable objective characteristic. Objectivity implies uniformity amongst 
conceptual formations and there would be no different interpretations if objectivity were 
accessible to then human experience. Since there are clearly differences in 
interpretations then the universe is either entirely without objectivity, or it is instilled with 
objectivity that is inaccessible and the kind of objectivity that is being debated here is 
actually something that is imposed on the universe by observers in an idealistic fashion. 
With the removal of objectivity also comes the removal of any kind of teleological 
implications, of which the PAP is a primary example.      
The interpretation of any given observation is dependent upon the conceptual 
resources of the observer. In the case of the PAP, the conceptual resource in question 
is actually observation itself. All of the evidence gathered in favor of the PAP stems from 
a physical events in the real world that all point back to a conceptual resource of 
conceptual resources themselves. To try and form a conceptual resource within itself is 
not possible without access to objectivity, and since observation is necessary for 
conceptual formation in the first place, the whole starting premises falls apart, and thus 
the PAP fails to be nothing more than a design argument in disguise.   
 
 
 
